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EQUITABLE RELIEF AGAINST JUDGMENTS
Is Ignorance an Excuse?

W HEN a

person finds that a judgment has been rendered
against him, either as plaintiff or defendant, and comes into
a court of equity saying, "Let's start over," will the fact that he
is old, illiterate, unfamiliar with the forms of legal procedure,
or otherwise "underprivileged" touch the conscience of the court?
By the common law, a trial court retains control over its judgments during the term of their rendition.' It may amend them, or
it may repudiate them completely and order a new trial. Statutes
in some jurisdictions extend this power, subject to prescribed conditions, beyond the end of the term.2 After the trial court loses
power over a judgment, relief may yet be obtained in a proper
case by a proceeding in equity-for an injunction to prevent the
prevailing party from making use of his judgment, by a bill of
review, or (under "blended" systems of law and equity) by what
may be called a bill in the nature of a bill of review.
In order to qualify for this extraordinary type of relief, the
disappointed litigant must show that he has a valid cause of action
or defense, which he was prevented from asserting or properly
presenting at the trial because of accident, mistake, misfortune,
or the wrongful act of the opposing party, unattended by any
wrong or negligence on his part Among the eventualities which
may or may not, under the circumstances, be regarded as sufficient
to warrant relief are sickness of a party, his attorney, or his wit-.
1 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) 375-377. For special provisions governing
finality of judgments and the time in which motions for new trial must be made in
certain Texas district courts having consecutive terms, see TEX. RULES CIv. PROC.
§§ 330, 330(k) and (1), construed and applied in Dallas Storage & Whse. Co. v. Taylor,
124 Tex, 315, 77 S. W. 2d 1031 (1934).
2 Id. at 420.
3 Marine Ins. Co. v. Hodgson, 7 Cranch 332 (U. S. 1813) ; Johnson v. Templeton,
60 Tex. 238 (1883); 1 JOYCE, INJUNCTIONS (1909) § 686. Even though all of the
requirements enumerated have been satisfied, relief may be withheld where rights of
innocent third parties have intervened. See Ramsey v. McKamey, 137 Tex. 91, 95, 152
S. W. 2d 322, 324 (1941).
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nesses; errors in the record; misunderstandings as to stipulations;
disqualification of the judge; mistakes, misconduct, or disqualification of the jury or its members; and extrinsic fraud on the part
of the opponent."
Equity favors the vigilant and will deny relief unless the applicant has been free of negligence at every stage in the proceedings. He must have devoted proper care and attention to the
prosecution or defense of the case before judgment. After judgment his failure seasonably to invoke the power of the trial court
to set aside the judgment and grant a new trial must not have
been due to any want of diligence on his part. And he must have
been prompt in pursuing the equitable remedy.
The subject of this inquiry is the question of whether or not,
in determining the issue of diligence, the court will consider such
personal deficiencies or handicaps of the applicant as advanced
age, inferior intelligence, illiteracy, or unfamiliarity with the processes of litigation. In other words, the point under investigation
is whether equity will apply a fixed and absolute criterion of diligence, whatever its stringency, to all comers, or will demand less
of some than of others.
At the outset certain general principles may be noted which
will influence the reviewing court, especially where the equities in
a particular case seem to be fairly balanced. In such a case the
court may deny relief, observing that the granting or withholding
of equitable relief is within the sound discretion of the trial court
and will be revised only upon a clear showing of abuse. If the
judgment below was by default, consideration may be given to
the policy of the law that every litigant is entitled to his day in
court-that the law does not favor snap decisions but contemplates
that controversies shall be determined according to their merits.
4 The

grounds upon which equitable relief will be granted, and the various fact

situations which have been held to authorize, or not to warrant, such relief, are

discussed at length in 3 FREEMAN,

JUDGMENTS

(5th ed. 1925) 2441-2626; 3

GRAHAM

NEw TIALS (1855) 1483-1547; 1 JoYcE, INJUNCTIONS (1909) 9231004, 2 id. 1005-1025; 31 Am. Jur. 216-258, Judgments, §§ 633-701; 49 C. J. S. 706-751,
AND WATERMAN,

Judgments, §§ 350-376.
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In any event, the applicant is confronted with the settled precept
that final judgments, solemnly rendered by courts of competent
jurisdiction, are watched by courts of equity with extreme jealousy
and will be disturbed only in exceptional cases. For, as is frequently stated in opinions refusing relief against judgments, the
public good demands that there should be an end to litigation.
Aside from the question of whether the standard is absolute or
relative,5 judicial expressions vary as to the degree of diligence
required of any litigant. It has been asserted by some tribunals
that the "highest degree" of diligence is necessary,' but other
courts demand only "ordinary diligence." 7 In some opinions may
be found statements to the effect that the applicant must have
exercised that degree of care which is requisite in "the ordinary
business of life."' There are numerous declarations that "reasonable diligence" must be shown; 9 but such a standard is of little
help, inasmuch as it could hardly be supposed that either law or
equity would ever require that which is unreasonable.'
5 1. e., relative to the mental capacities of the person whose conduct is under
scrutiny.
6 Norman v. Burns, 67 Ala. 248 (1880) ; Goelitz v. Lathrop, 286 Ill. App. 248, 3 N. E.
2d 305 (1936); accord, Burnley v. Rice, Adams & Co., 21 Tex. 171 (1858), requiring
"strictest diligence."
7 Hollister v. Sobra, 264 Ill. 535, 106 N. E. 507 (1914) ; Semple v. McGatagan, 10
Smedes & March. 98 (Miss. 1848). "While courts of equity are not inclined to interfere
with judgments in the absence of a strong showing to justify it, they do not require
that a party should have exercised the highest possible degree of care in order that
he may obtain relief. Reasonable and ordinary care considering the circumstances will
suffice." 3 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) 2502. Cl. Laithe v. McDonald, 12 Kan.
340 (1873), where the court expresses the opinion that a party must exercise "extraordinary diligence" in anticipating and preparing for errors on the part of the court or
jury, hut need show only "reasonable and ordinary" diligence in preventing fraud on
the part of his opponent.
8 Boyd v. Blankman, 29 Cal. 20 (1865) ; Burton v. Perkins, 26 Vt. 157 (1854).
9 Harding v. Hawkins, 141 Ill. 572, 31 N. E. 307 (1892) ; 138 Ind. 363, 36 N. E.
1114 (1894) ; Ayres v. Smith, 76 N. E. 2d 274 (Ind. App. 1948), aff'd, 84 N. E. 2d 185
(Ind. Supr. Ct. 1949) ; Van Norman v. Van Norman, 205 Miss. 114, 38 So. 2d 452
(1949) ; Mayor, Etc. of N.Y. v. Brady, 115 N.Y. 699, 22 N. E. 237 (1889).
10 Equally illusory is the test provided in Spokane Co-operative Mining Co. v.
Pearson, 28 Wash. 118, 68 Pac. 165, 168 (1902), a suit to enjoin a judgment alleged to
have been procured by fraud. There the court said that such relief could not be
granted "unless it be shown that the information [of the fraud] could not have been
obtained by the care and attention necessary in preparing a case for trial, and which
one is bound to exercise when sued."

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5

Neither the cases exacting extraordinary diligence nor those
accepting ordinary care as sufficient settle the question here under
consideration; for what would be a high degree of diligence in
an uneducated foreigner, unable to speak or understand the English language, might conceivably be regarded as no more than
ordinary or slight care when exercised by a man active and successful in matters of business.
Cases which can be cited as squarely holding either the affirmative or the negative of the proposition are not numerous. Even
where the personal deficiencies of the applicant are urged in the
bill and referred to in the court's statement of the case, a decision
one way or the other may not necessarily mean an acceptance or a
rejection of the relative standard. The judges may feel that the
degree of diligence shown would have been enough even in the
case of a person of average experience and intelligence; or, on
the other hand, they may think that, conceding that less should
be required of the particular litigant before them than of the
average man, yet he has failed to pursue that course of conduct
which might reasonably be expected even of a person of his
meager faculties.
Thus, in the Louisiana case of Miller v. Bearb11 the plaintiff
in a suit to annul a decree of separation sought to excuse her
failure to defend in the prior suit on the ground that she was
ignorant and unable to read or write. While not denying that such
factors might sometimes be relevant, the court rejected this excuse
and withheld relief, it being apparent from the evidence that
"she understood the purpose of the summons served upon her."
Conversely, in a case in a Texas court of civil appeals, 2 the
court mentioned the fact that plaintiffs were "ignorant Negroes",
in holding that there was evidence in support of the trial court's
finding that they were not guilty of laches in filing their bill to
review a judgment. This case approaches nearer, perhaps, to a
definite commitment on the point than does the one first discussed;
11 134 La. 893, 64 So. 822, 823 (1914).
12 Early v. Burns, 142 S. W. 2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) er. ref.
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but it did not appear that the issue was raised by the pleadings,
argued by counsel, or deliberately considered by the court, and
the facts were such that the result might well have been the same
although the plaintiffs had been more advantageously situated.
In Ramirez v. Martinez," another Texas case, the plaintiff,
suing in equity to set aside a default, alleged that he had attended
two terms of court, that thereafter the legislature had changed
the time of holding court, advancing it one month, that he had not
resided in the county where the suit was brought for two years,
and that he was unable to speak, read, or write the English
language. The report is very brief, the court merely summarizing
the allegations of the bill and approving the trial court's action
in overruling defendant's demurrer.
On the subject of Texas cases, reference may be made to the
recent and much discussed case of Alexander v. Hagedorn.14
Hagedorn, against whom a default judgment had been taken, was
an uneducated German immigrant, seventy-five years old and
unable to read the English language. He went to the courthouse
on the day named in the citation, was informed that there would
be no court held that week, and returned home, relying upon his
"understanding" that the clerk would notify him when to appear
for trial.
Hagedorn sued in equity to set aside the judgment, and the
trial judge granted the relief sought, reporting in his findings of
fact that he would not have granted the default in the original
action but for certain statements and testimony on the part of
Alexander which subsequently were found to be false. In the
supreme court the justices disagreed upon the question whether
this fact could be considered in support of the decree, the majority
being of the opinion that the fraud found was "intrinsic" and
therefore not a ground upon which equitable relief could be
awarded.
The only other express pronouncement by the majority was
13
14

208 S. W. 380 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
Tex.,226 S. W. 2d 996 (1950).
-
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that a party is not entitled to rely upon promises by court officials
and employees under the circumstances here presented. However,
Justice Smedley, who, with Justice Taylor, dissented, contended
so strenuously for the application of a relative standard 5 (without
denominating it as such) that it is possible to interpret the decision as an implicit rejection of such a standard.
A disposition to judge all parties by the same standard of diligence was shown in the Florida case of City of Gainesville v.
Johnson, 6 in which it was sought to set aside decrees pro confesso
rendered against the defendants in the former suit. It appeared
that the defendants were "ignorant, illiterate, colored people" and
did not understand that a suit had been brought against them or
that it would be necessary to have an attorney to represent them.
The court reversed a decree granting the relief sought and, after
setting forth the matters necessary to be shown in order to invoke
the aid of equity against judgments and decrees, observed:
"The facts
reared in the
shown to the
class, but they

set forth may appeal to the sympathies of a judge
atmosphere of that tender consideration so generally
illiterate negroes by descendants of the slave-owner
17
do not come up to the rule so frequently enunciated.'

To the same effect is the opinion in a case decided by the
Supreme Court of Nevada, in which the plaintiff, a Pennsylvania
farmer, poor and in ill health, sought to set aside a decree of
distribution of an estate, consisting of property in Nevada, asserting a claim as heir. The court, in affirming the trial court's judgment denying relief, said:
"Courts 'can not obliterate the recognized rules of law, requiring
of all persons the diligence and attention demanded of a prudent man
15 ... I am firmly convinced that the court, in deciding the question whether
respondent was negligent, should take into consideration all of the facts, including
respondent's handicaps, his age, his want of information and of education, and his
inexperience with courts and litigation....
"Respondent was diligent to the extent of his capacity, understanding and information." Id. at 1006.
1659 Fla. 459, 51 So. 852 (1910).
17 51 So. at 853.
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in the transaction of his own business, and establish a measure of
care and diligence for each particular case.' "Is

A like test was applied in Wood v. Lenox, 9 a Texas case in
which the applicant pleaded delicate health as an excuse for his
inattention to a suit which he himself had instituted and wherein
judgment had been rendered against him on a cross-action. "The
diligence required," the court asserted, ".

.

. is such as prudent

and careful men would ordinarily use in their own cases of equal
importance.''2

Language such as that used in the two cases last noted suggests the postulation by the court of a supposed "reasonable man,"
with whose conduct in a given situation the acts of parties before
the court must favorably compare. Similar, but distinguishable,
are expressions sometimes found to the effect that litigants must
exercise such "care and diligence, and prudence as is requisite
in the ordinary business of life."'" Here no hypothetical paragon
is contemplated, and the way remains open for the use of a relative standard, provided such a standard may be applied in appraising a person's conduct in ordinary business transactions. On this
point, in reversing a decree of rescission of a land transaction,
the Texas Supreme Court said:
"Courts cannot measure the relative intelligence and business
qualifications of parties to a transaction, unless it reaches the point
is Royce v. Hampton, 16 Nev. 25, 33, 34 (1881), quoting Boyd v. Blankman, 29 Cal.
20, 44 (1865). The allegation of poverty, held in this case to be no excuse, was similarly
dismissed in Ham v. Phelps, 65 Tex. 592, 598 (1886), where it was said: "That a party
may be poor is no reason why he should not be held to the same rule of diligence in
prosecuting suits instituted by himself as are other persons."
When poverty is asserted as an excuse for an applicant's faijure to hire a lawyer
(see text at note 39, infra), he may be answered, as was the petitioner in the Royce
case, supra, by the court's observation that his financial condition is not shown to have
been any better after the judgment than before, and he "is now represented by able
counsel."
19 5 Tex. Civ. App. 318, 23 S. W. 812 (1893).
201 d. at 322, 23 S .W. at 813. As authority for this statement the court cited Taylor,

Knapp & Co. v. Fore, 42 Tex. 256, 258 (1875), where similar language is used and
attributed, without citation, to Justice Story.
21 Burton v. Perkins, 26 Vt. 157, 158 (1854).
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where it appears
that one has overreached the other by reason of
' 22
his incapacity.

And
decree
ground
"could

the Supreme Court of Nebraska stated, in affirming a
of foreclosure where the mortgagor had defended on the
that she was "weak-minded in business matters," and
not read English":

"The mere fact that a person is unlearned, and ignorant of legal
proceedings, affords no ground for relief in equity, unless the person
23
against whom relief is sought misrepresented the facts to him."

The circumstance of an applicant's ignorance, illiteracy, etc.
has frequently been urged in support of motions made in term
time to vacate or to set aside judgments and for new trials. While
these cases are not strictly in point as precedents where the same
matters are asserted in applications for equitable relief, it may
be pertinent to inquire as to the attitude taken by the courts in
such cases toward the propriety of measuring a particular litigant
with a shorter yardstick than that held up to another under similar
circumstances.
Although there may be room for argument that a stricter showing of diligence should be required after the expiration of the
term than while the judgment is still "within the breast" of the
trial court, 24 its resolution, one way or the other, should not affect
22

Moore v. Cross, 87 Tex. 557, 562, 29 S. W. 1051, 1053 (1895).

23 Meyer v. Schmidt, 135 Neb. 850, 284 N. W. 337, 339 (1939).
24 In Goss v. McClaren, 17 Tex. 107, 121 (1856), after declaring that "no one would
be heard to contend" that the excuse offered would have been sufficient if presented
in support of a motion during the term, the court went on to say,
"Can it be supposed ... that a new trial should be granted upon an original
proceeding, for causes for which it could not legally have been granted, if timely
application had been made? If there be anything which is perfectly clear,
beyond all question, on principle and authority, it is the opposite of such proposition."
But compare the expression of the same court, two years later: "The application,
whether made before or after the term, is addressed to the same court, having cognizance of both legal and equitable causes; and there can be no reason why it should
not be governed by precisely the same principles in the one case as the other; only with
this qualification, that as the rule of law requires that the application be made during
the term at which the verdict is rendered, if this be not done, the party must show an
equitable excuse to entitle him to a hearing of his application after the term." Varde-
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the question at hand. For whether the standard be higher, lower,
or the same, it may nevertheless be different as to one class of
litigants from what it is when applied to another.
Cases dealing with motions made during the term as well as
those concerning bills in equity are not in agreement on the point.
In Martin v. Curley, 5 an appeal from an order vacating a default,
defendant had failed to pay taxes and plaintiff had obtained a tax
title. Defendant received a summons in plantiff's action to determine the adverse claim, but thought it was "only another attempt"
by plaintiff's attorney to exact a sum previously demanded for a
settlement. The court, in affirming the order of the court below,
said:
"Defendant's excuse for his neglect to appear and defend the
action is certainly very scant, but, under all the circumstances, we
cannot say that the court abused its discretion... . In the first place, it
is a matter of common knowledge that a great many of the plain
people, ignorant of the law, never entertain the idea that they can lose
their property on a tax title. To them it means nothing more serious
'26
than the payment of interest and penalties, and possibly a bonus.
Byrne v. Alas27 was an appeal from an order vacating a default

judgment in ejectment against defendants described as "mission
Indians." The court sustained the action of the trial judge, saying
of the defendants:
"They are very ignorant and helpless, totally unacquainted with

our modes of judicial proceedings, and are utterly incapable of
attending to their interest, if they have any, in regard to the land
in controversy. The defendants are ignorant of the English language,

with, perhaps, one or two exceptions.... Under these circumstances
rigid rule should be applied to them on the
we do not think a very
28
question of default."
man v. Edwards, 21 Tex. 737, 741 (1858). See, to the same effect, Burnley v. Rice,
Adams & Co., 21 Tex. 171, 180 (1858), and Boise Payette Lbr. Co. v. Idaho Gold
Dredging Corp., 56 Idaho 660, 58 P. 2d 786, 789 (1936), cert. denied, 299 U. S. 577
(1936).
2570 Minn. 489, 73 N. W. 405 (1897).
26 73 N. W. at 406.

Cal. 479, 9 Pac. 850 (1886).
Ibid.

2768

28
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A different attitude was evinced by the Alabama Supreme Court
in Contorno v. Ensley Lbr. Co.,2" another case of a motion for new
trial where judgment had been by default. There the court declared:
"Appellant had no sufficient excuse for failing to propound his
defense upon the regular call of the case for trial. Ignorant foreigners
as well as others must30 be held to a knowledge of the regular procedure in the courts.
As has been stated, some jurisdictions have, by statute, extended
the power of trial courts over their judgments beyond the ending
of the term at which they were rendered.3 ' These statutes commonly prescribe as prerequisites to the exercise of such power,
substantially the same elements as are held to warrant the granting of motions during the term and of equitable relief after its
close.
It should be noted that courts reviewing cases arising under
these statutes may be encouraged to accord special deference to
persons of little experience and meager intellectual endowments
because of a view that the statutes are remedial in character and
should be liberally construed and applied.32 Their solicitude for
the classes of persons here under consideration is not, however,
entirely without significance in cases where such persons are
seeking equitable relief. Liberality of statutory interpretation is
no justification for treating one class of litigants differently from
another-at least where the statute contains no hint that such
discrimination was intended by the legislature.
Mr. Freeman, in his work on judgments, 3 expressly asserts the
existence of a relative standard where such statutes are involved.
He cites cases in which consideration was given by the courts to
29211 Ala. 211, 100 So. 127 (1924).
30 100 So. at 128.
31 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925)

420.

32 Rosebud Lbr. Co. v. Serr, 22 S. D. 389, 117 N. W. 1042 (1908) ; MacDonald v.

Orton, 99 Vt. 425, 134 At. 599 (1926).
33 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) 476, 477.
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the facts that the applicant or applicants were "foreigners, ItalianSwiss, and utterly unable to understand, read, or write the English
language";" "over seventy years of age, totally blind, illiterate,
and unable to write his name" ;" "an old man of seventy years";36
"unable to read English," and "had no knowledge of court
methods";7 and "of foreign descent, and not familiar with the
methods of commencing actions in our courts.""
There is general agreement among the authorities that, in order
to discharge his duty of diligence, a party must employ counsel,
provide him with the necessary information, and assist him in
the procuring of evidence and otherwise conducting the case. 9
Since the litigant is responsible for the acts and omissions of his
attorney, the right of the former in equity to review a judgment
may depend upon the conduct of the latter in the original action.
It might be thought that, while a relative standard may be reserved
for appraising the industry of the party in assisting his lawyer,
surely the counselor himself will be judged by an inflexible
criterion. Yet at least one sympathetic court has been willing, upon
appeal, to open a default "attributable to the inexperience of the
defendant's attorney. ' 40
It would seem that a better argument might be made for applying a relative standard to persons actually of inferior mental
caliber than could be mustered in cases of mere unfamiliarity
with the language or inability to read or write. Indeed, it might
be said that persons suffering from the latter handicaps should
be especially circumspect when involved in legal entanglements,
Berri v. Rogero, 168 Cal. 736, 145 Pac. 95, 96 (1914).
35 Stone v. McWilliams, 43 Cal. App. 490, 185 Pac. 478, 479 (1919).
36 Banse v. Wells, 44 Cal. App. 145, 186 Pac. 192, 193 (1919).
37 Wood v. Schoenauer, 85 Minn. 138, 88 N. W. 411, 412 (1901).
38 Rosebud Lbr. Co. v. Serr, 22 S.D. 389, 117 N. W. 1042, 1043 (1908).
"9Booker v. Coulter, 151 S. W. 335 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) ; 3 FREEMAN, JUICMENTS
(5th ed. 1925) 2504; and see cases cited in 31 L.R.A. 35, n.II, b (1896).
40 Kraus v. Comet Film Co., 139 N.Y.S. 306 (1913). Cf. Delewski v. Delewski, 76
Ind. App. 44, 131 N. E. 229, 230 (1921), an appeal from an order denying an application to set aside a default, where it was said, "... [T]he diligence required of an attorney
is such as a man of ordinary prudence gives to his own important business."
34
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since they should realize their disadvantage in such circumstances.
Under this view, exceptional lenience should be shown, if at all,
only toward those who are so ignorant as to be unaware of their
shortcomings. Thus considered, the question is narrowed to one
of whether a man's conduct should be judged in the light of his
intelligence quotient.
The facts of each case, aside from the fact of what the applicant
did or failed to do, are to be considered in determining the issue
of diligence. In other words, was the action or omission of the
party diligence or negligence in view of the circumstances surrounding such act or omission? It may be suggested that the
ignorance, illiteracy, or similar deficiency of the party should be
included among those circumstances.41 When the question is so
stated, perhaps the word "surrounding" is itself a clue to the
answer-suggesting as it does external, extrinsic, or objective facts
and circumstances as distinguished from the personal attributes
and peculiarities of the individual.
To require less of one party to a lawsuit may be to demand
more of his adversary. Must one who sues an illiterate foreigner
or any ignorant person do more, to assure the inviolability of
any judgment he may obtain, than the plaintiff who proceeds
against a person outside the category of unfortunates? The law
prescribes the manner of subjecting defendants to the jurisdiction
of the court and the process by which default judgments may be
obtained. A plaintiff could hardly be expected to go further and
provide an interpreter, or personally to communicate with the
defendant and explain to him just what is happening.
It may be argued in favor of a fixed criterion that it is simpler
to apply. If the acts of all suitors are to be weighed upon the
same scale, the court, upon being confronted with a case in which
the applicant for relief neglected to read the summons, or relied
upon a statement of a judge or clerk as to when a case was to be
tried, can ascertain what the result was when another defendant
41 See excerpt from Justice Smedley's dissent in the Hagedorn case, quoted supra
note 15.

